Models of evolution by natural selection often make the simplifying assumption that 9 populations are infinitely large. In this infinite population limit, rare mutations that 10 are selected against always go extinct, whereas in finite populations they can persist 11 and even reach fixation. Nevertheless, for mutations of small phenotypic effect, it is 12 widely believed that in sufficiently large populations, if selection opposes the invasion 13 of rare mutants, then it also opposes their fixation. Here, we identify circumstances 14 under which infinite-population models do or do not accurately predict evolutionary 15 outcomes in large, finite populations. We show that there is no population size above 16 which considering only invasion generally suffices: for any finite population size, there 17 are situations in which selection opposes the invasion of mutations of arbitrarily small 18 effect, but favours their fixation. This is not an unlikely limiting case; it can occur 19 when fitness is a smooth function of the evolving trait, and when the selection process 20 is biologically sensible. Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which opposition 21 of invasion does imply opposition of fixation: in fact, for the n-player snowdrift game 22 (a common model of cooperation) we identify sufficient conditions under which selec-23 tion against rare mutants of small effect precludes their fixation-in sufficiently large 24 populations-for any selection process. We also find conditions under which-no mat-25 ter how large the population-the trait that fixes depends on the selection process, 26 which is important because any particular selection process is only an approximation 27 of reality. 28 evolutionary game theory | finite populations | evolutionary stability | selection process ORCID IDs of authors: CM Adaptive dynamics is a widely used and extremely successful framework for investigating the 30 evolution of continuous traits by natural selection (1). In this framework, it is assumed that 31 the population is infinite and well-mixed, and that any single mutation has an extremely 32 small phenotypic effect. One of its significant contributions is a simple method for identifying 33 locally evolutionarily stable strategies (local ESSs). If residents are playing a local 34 ESS then rare mutants playing a distinct but sufficiently similar strategy cannot invade the 35 population (1, 2).
− C (X) + N − n N − 1 B (nX) < 0 (3b) ( § 2) do not completely determine the strategy dynamics that unfold following the introduc-143 tion of a mutant. In particular, fixation probabilities naturally depend on the selection 144 process, i.e., on how fitnesses are used to determine changes in the frequencies of the two 145 traits that are present in the population over time [see Ref. (18) ]. Without specifying a 146 particular selection process, it is in general impossible to identify strategies that are ESS N s 147 (i.e., evolutionarily stable in a population of size N ); whether selection opposes the fixation 148 of mutants playing a strategy sufficiently similar to the residents depends on the selection 149 process. 150 In the next two subsections, we introduce further notation related to the mean fitness 151 difference, and a class of selection processes that we will use in later sections. We now introduce convenient notation to simplify the Taylor expansion of the mean fitness 154 difference δW (x, X) in the mutant strategy x about a singular resident strategy X. 155 Using equation (3a) and the identity δW (X, X) = 0 (neutral mutations do not confer 156 a fitness advantage), for any number of mutants i (1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) we can write the mean 157 fitness difference 158 δW =i/N (x, X) = 1 2
159 where ∆x = x − X, and 160 ω i := ∂ 2 x δW =i/N (x, X) x=X , i = 1, . . . , N − 1 ,
161 are the fitness difference curvatures. Note that ω i depends on the resident strategy X, 162 but we make this dependence implicit for notational convenience. 163 Using equations (4.64) and (4.71) of Ref. (17), the coefficient ω i is given by 164 ω i = 1 + 2(n − 1) i − 1 N − 1 − (n − 1) 2(i − 1)(n − 2) + (N − 2) (N − 1)(N − 2) B (nX) − C (X) . (6) 165 166 In particular,
168 169 so setting 170 ∆ω := 2 (n − 1)(N − n) (N − 1)(N − 2) B (nX) ,
we have
3.2.2 Symmetric birth-death processes that end, in appendix A we define a class of biologically sensible selection processes-which 178 we call symmetric birth-death (or SBD) processes-for which fixation probabilities 179 can be conveniently expressed in terms of differences in mean fitness. If there are i mutants 180 in the population (with 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1), and if we denote the mean fitness difference by 181 δ i := δW =i/N (x, X) ,
182 then the inverse of the fixation probability is 184 where φ > 0 is a parameter that depends on which SBD process is chosen. SBD processes 185 are used in § 4 for analyses that depend only on equation (11) and in § 6.2 for numerical 186 simulations; the particulars of how SBD processes are defined (in appendix A) are not 187 essential to understand the results. In § 5 and § 6.3, we present more general results that are 188 not specific to SBD processes. In this section, we demonstrate that for any given population size N and any group size 192 n < N , there are games for which selection opposes invasion but favours fixation (of mutant 193 strategies that can be arbitrarily close to a singular strategy played by residents).
194
Consider the evolution of contributions to an n-player snowdrift game (as described in §2) 195 in a finite population of size N governed by an SBD selection process (defined in appendix A).
196
In this situation, we show that it is possible to find benefit and cost functions, B and C, and 197 a resident strategy X, such that 198 mutants that play a strategy (x) that is different from-but sufficiently similar 199 to-the resident strategy (X) obtain lower fitness when rare, yet selection favours 200 the fixation of such mutants.
201
The conditions for this are stated precisely in proposition 1, which we prove in appendix B.
202
Proposition 1. Consider an evolving population of finite size N , where fitnesses are deter-203 mined by playing the n-player snowdrift game as described in § 2. If residents play a singular 204 strategy (i.e., a strategy X that satisfies equation (3a)), and in addition,
206 207 then for any sufficiently similar strategies x (i.e., for |x − X| sufficiently small ), selection 208 opposes the invasion of mutants playing x, but favours their fixation under any SBD selection 209 process ( § 3.2.2 and appendix A).
210
It is easy to find functions B and C that satisfy the conditions in proposition 1. In § 6.2,
211
we construct explicit examples of games that satisfy the hypotheses of proposition 1 and 212 therefore exhibit fixation of strategies that are opposed by selection when rare. In §4 we fixed the population size N and found conditions guaranteeing that selection opposes 216 invasion but favours fixation; these conditions are satisfied by many snowdrift games. In this 217 section, we fix the game (a snowdrift game with specific benefit and cost functions and a 218 fixed group size † ) but not the population size. We consider situations in which the game has 219 an ESS if played in an infinite population and ask whether it also has an ESS N if played in 220 a sufficiently large finite population.
221
Proposition 2 below (proved in appendix C) provides the answer, which is not as simple If, in addition, the fitness difference curvature ω N −1 (equation (5)) is negative for sufficiently 241 large N , i.e., if there exists a population size N such that
then there exists N * ≥ N such that for any N ≥ N * , X * N is a UESS N . A sufficient condition 244 for such an N to exist is that
246 247 † By a fixed group size we mean that the size of the interacting group (n) is independent of the population size (N ). For example, the typical size of groups travelling in cars that are obstructed by snowdrifts would be the same in small and large cities. ‡ In particular, in the biologically sensible case of accelerating costs and decelerating benefits, condition (13) always holds.
249 then there exists N * ≥ N such that for all N ≥ N * , for mutations of arbitrarily small effect, 250 selection favours fixation for some selection processes, but opposes fixation for other selection 251 processes; a sufficient condition for such an N to exist is that
253 254
Conditions (16) and (18) are easy to check because the limit can be expressed directly 255 in terms of the benefit and cost functions: Equations (8) and (9) give
Since, in addition, In this section, we illustrate the predictions of propositions 1 and 2 with examples, using 282 a subclass of snowdrift games that we define in § 6.1. The particular examples are then 283 described in § §6.2 and 6.3. 284 6.1 A class of quadratic snowdrift games
where the coefficients are
We denote such a game for particular ν and ξ as G n (ν, ξ), and the family of all such games 296 for fixed group size n as
298
Note that games in this class differ only in their cost functions. 
Note, however, that for some choices of the coefficients (b 1 , b 2 , c 1 , c 2 ), X * ∞ and X * N can be 307 negative (and therefore biologically irrelevant). For the specific benefit and cost coefficients 308 given by equation (22), i.e., for all games in the class F n , equations (24a) and (24b) become
It is straightforward to show that X * N > X * ∞ > 0 for any ξ > n and ν ∈ [1, 2).
To guarantee that the singular strategy X * ∞ given by equation (25a) To see this, we verify that condition (26) implies that condition (2b) is satisfied: With 320 quadratic benefit and cost functions, condition (2b) yields c 2 > b 2 , and inserting equa- Given a finite population size N , we now consider the subclass of games G n (ν, ξ) for which
given N , note that the games in this subclass can also be played in an infinite population.
333
When a game in G n (N, ν) is played in a finite population of size N , proposition 1 applies.
334
Thus, under an SBD selection process (appendix A), if residents play the singular strategy 335 X * N , selection favours fixation of mutations of arbitrarily small effect, so X * N is not an ESS N . [given below in equation (29a)] is an ESS for any ξ = N > 2n (see § 6.1.2). We corroborate 340 this prediction using individual-based simulations in figure 1.
341
To verify that proposition 1 holds for any game G n (N, ν) (with 2 > ν ≥ 1), note first 342 that when ξ = N , equation (25a) reduces to which is positive for any N ≥ 2 because 2 > ν > 0.
349
Next, substituting equation (21) into condition (12) gives We now apply proposition 2 to identify games in the class F n that have an ESS when played 358 in an infinite population but-depending on the selection process-either have, or do not 359 have, an ESS N when played in arbitrarily large finite populations § . To do this, we must find 360 games G n (ν, ξ) ∈ F n that (i) have an infinite population ESS X * ∞ , (ii) satisfy condition (13), 361 and (iii) have the property that there is a population size N such that condition (17) is 362 satisfied.
tion (30) becomes
353 0 < 1 < N − 1 N − n N − n N − 1 1 + ν n − 1 N < 1 + 2 n − 1 N ,(31)
363
First, to ensure that there is always an infinite population ESS, we assume ν and ξ satisfy 364 condition (26).
365
Second, we note that for games in F n , condition (13) simplifies to Substituting ξ = N in equation (33) gives Evolutionary game theory has been developed primarily under the approximation of an 383 infinite background population (2, 5, 19-23). In this setting, the notion of evolutionary sta-384 bility can be formalized simply as "selection opposes invasion" and the details of the selection 385 § For sufficiently large populations, condition (12) does not hold for quadratic snowdrift games, so proposition 1 does not apply to these games. Consequently, we cannot say whether or not an ESS N exists when such games are played in arbitrarily large but finite populations under SBD selection processes.
A Symmetric birth-death selection processes 494
Let M p (t) be the number of mutant individuals at time t; since individuals are either mutants 495 or residents, M p (t) completely specifies the population state at time t. If M p (t) = i for 496 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 then both mutants and residents are present so we refer to a mixed 497 population state. 498 We define a discrete-time birth-death process that-based on the fitness difference be-499 tween mutants and residents-changes the composition of the population over time; for 500 convenience, we use P to denote both this process, and the transition matrix that defines it.
501
Specifically, we set where the dependence of the transition probability ratios R i (i = 1, . . . , N − 1) on 508 the mean fitness differences δW (x, X) ( § 3.2) will be specified shortly. The following two 509 conditions must be satisfied for equation (36b) to make biological and mathematical sense: creases, must be independent of whether type A is labelled as the mutant or resident.
519
Mathematically, if mutants and residents are interchanged, state i becomes state N −i, 520 and the mean fitness difference δW =i/N (x, X) becomes −δW =(N −i)/N (x, X). Thus, we 521 require that
. should decrease the probability that the number of mutants increases.
530
For simplicity, we assume that the ratios of probabilities of mutants increasing and de-531 creasing (P i,i−1 /P i,i+1 ) depend on the mean fitness difference δW =i/N (x, X), but not on the 532 population state i, so that, with minor abuse of notation, only one transition probability 533 ratio function is needed, R i = R for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1, and
Condition (37) then becomes R(x)R(−x) = 1. Since R > 0, this is equivalent to where r : R → R is odd. Since R is decreasing, r must also be decreasing. 541 We assume henceforth that r is analytic in a neighbourhood of x = 0. Because r is odd, 542 r (n) (0) = 0 for any non-negative even integer n, and letting φ = −r (0) > 0, we have 543
Consequently, for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, equation (36b) gives
where δ i = δW =i/N (x, X) as in equation (10).
547
Equation (36) leaves some freedom in that we do not specify how likely it is for the 548 population to remain at the same state (i.e., that M p (t + 1) = M p (t)); this affects the speed 549 of evolution, but not the fixation probabilities. For concreteness, we can set P i,i = 0 for all 550 i = 1, . . . , N , in which case equations (36b) and (36c) can be solved explicitly to obtain
We have thus constructed a class of birth-death processes, determined by the choice of the 555 logarithm r of the transition probability ratio R, which must be a decreasing odd function (III) starting from any mixed population state it is possible for the mutation to either fixate 563 or become extinct, that is, the probabilities of these outcomes happening at some future 564 time are nonzero.
565
Consequently, P is indeed a selection process as defined in Ref. (18) . Moreover, P satisfies 566 the consistency condition (37) by construction and, for smooth r, depends smoothly on the 567 mean fitness difference δW =i/N (x, X).
568
If initially one mutant individual playing x enters the population (M p (0) = 1), the 569 probability that the mutation fixes can be calculated exactly (because P is a birth-death 570 process) and is given by Because ω i is linear in i [equation (9)], this is achieved if
596 597
Using equations (7) and (8), this is equivalent to
607 608
where we have used φ > 0 [equation (41)] and 0 < ω 2 ≤ ω 3 ≤ · · · ≤ ω N −1 to obtain 609 inequality (48). Simplifying the term in square brackets gives 
It follows that if ∆x is sufficiently small then 1 p fix < N (so p fix > 1 N as desired) provided that
631 632
Now recall that in order to ensure that selection opposes invasion of similar mutants, but 633 that the mean fitness of mutants is higher than that of residents when the population contains 634 two or more mutants, condition (47) 
647 648 in which case both ω 1 < 0 and p fix > 1 N , as desired ¶ . 649 ¶ Because N +2(n−1) N > 1, the right hand side of condition (56) is greater than the left whenever B (nX) > 0, so condition (56) cannot be satisfied if the benefit function is concave.
It can be shown that if the population size N is sufficiently large, there is a finite-population 651 singular strategy X * N [i.e., a solution of equation (3a)]; moreover, the sequence of these 652 singular strategies approaches X * ∞ as N → ∞ (see lemma 3 in appendix D). Henceforth, 653 assume without loss of generality that N is sufficiently large that the singular strategy X * N 654 exists. Taking the limit N → ∞ in equation (7) we find 655 lim N →∞
656 657
which is negative because we assume that equation (2) is satisfied. Consequently, for N large 658 enough, ω 1 < 0. that ω i < 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1. Hence, from equation (4), we have δW (x, X * N ) < 0 for 662 x sufficiently close to but different from X * N . In other words, if residents play X * N , mutants 663 playing a strategy that is sufficiently similar to the residents' obtain a lower fitness than 664 residents, regardless of the number of mutants (i.e., for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1). Thus, selection 
we have f (X * ∞ , 1) = 0, because X * ∞ is singular in an infinite population, and so satisfies 690 equation (2a). Noting that ∂ X f (X, ρ)| (X,ρ)=(X * ∞ ,1) = nB (nX * ∞ ) − C (X * ∞ ), the hypothesis 691 that nB (nX * ∞ ) − C (X * ∞ ) = 0 implies that 692 ∂ X f (X, ρ)| (X,ρ)=(X * ∞ ,1) = 0 .
(59) 693 Therefore, from the implicit function theorem [e.g., (24, Theorem 12.40)], there is a differ- 
